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ORDERING INJUSTICE: CONGRESS, COMMAND
CORRUPTION OF COURTS-MARTIAL, AND THE
CONSTITUTION
Rachel E. VanLandingham*

ABSTRACT

Remedies in criminalprocedure, Justice Cardozo lamented almost
a century ago, at times require that "the criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered." This result is premised on the theory that
grave injustices in the criminal procedure arena require strong
countermeasures to both deter future abuses and reinforce systemic
legitimacy. In the military, fundamental structural vulnerability to
command corruption of its criminal justice system has infrequently
warranted reversals of otherwise valid convictions: some convicted
military criminals have gone free because the command chain
blundered.
While military appellate courts' reversals of servicemember
convictions due to unlawful command influence are rare, two
high-profile military sexual assault convictions overturned on this basis
caused much consternation. The resultant, and understandable,
teeth-gnashing about lack of justice for military sexual assault victims
belied signficant under-appreciation of the grave vulnerability of
military justice to commanders' whims, a structural defect strongly
representedby these cases.
As Justice Holmes long ago noted, hard cases make bad law, and
that is exactly what Congress did in reaction to these troubling cases:
made bad law. Despite the significant due process issues at stake, in
response to these cases Congress, in the 2020 military spending bill,
legislatively tried to gut the military trialjudiciary and appellate courts'
ability to remedy, and hence deter, the most insidious instance of
* Rachel E. VanLandingham, Lt. Col., United States Air Force (ret.), is a Professor of Law
at Southwestern Law School in Los Angeles, California. She thanks the Hofstra Law Review for this
Symposium invitation to publish, Professor Joshua Kastenberg for his insight, and Professor
Brenner Fissell for shepherding this Military Justice Symposium.
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command corruption of military criminal proceedings: unlawful
command influence.
But Congress cannot legislate away the Constitution. This Article
shows how the top military appellate court can protect the due process
rights of those in uniform by reminding Congress that the statutory life
preserver it deflated is constitutionally required. The military's uniquely
coercive environment remains unchanged, with its justice system
swimming against the same powerful, and at times corrosive, command
tide-but now with much less protection against such corruption, at
least by statute, unless the militaryjudiciaryacts. The top military court
should rule in fidelity to the Constitution by determining that unlawful
command influence in all its forms, including the "apparent" variety,
violates due process, regardless of the latest statutory changes, and
therefore should grant appropriate judicial remedies-including
reversals-whensuch violations occur.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the National Defense Authorization Act of 20201 ("NDAA
2020"), enacted in December 2019, Congress tried to gut a vital
procedural safeguard in the military justice system, an attempt that will
only be successful if the military's highest appellate court is
complicitous. This congressional effort to both eliminate the military's
"apparent" unlawful command influence doctrine, and to limit "actual"
unlawful command influence to only intentional misconduct, was
smuggled into the voluminous defense budget legislation in statutory
language that masked the real impact of these changes to all but the most
astute military justice observers.2
Passed without any public debate, these misguided attempts to
lessen servicemembers' constitutional right to untainted, fair criminal
proceedings further erode the legitimacy of the military justice system,
one already battered and bruised by various tidal waves. A respected,
elected member of Congress, one who admirably works against sexual
assault in the military, together with a Department of Defense that
understandably hates seeing convictions of guilty servicemembers
overturned by military courts due to legal error, with the best of
intentions, shepherded these changes into fruition with little
transparency.3 But those who truly understand constitutional due process
and military justice history, plus appreciate the strong tendency of

1. Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 1198.
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. See
Military
Sexual
Violence,
CONGRESSWOMAN
https://speier.house.gov/military-sexual-violence (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
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military criminal processes toward command corruption, see these
changes as deeply misguided. Constitutionally-mandated workarounds
are needed, such as presented in this Article, particularly if the greater
change such cases seem to warrant-the removal of all prosecutorial
discretion from commanders, to be vested in military lawyers
independent from the chain-of-command instead-remains a wistful
pipedream. 4
The battering of military justice legitimacy has seemingly been
regular as of late. Not only have the failed military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay rightly cast a pall of illegitimacy over the entire
American military justice system, but this system has also already been,
for years, at the center of the military's struggles with its sexual assault
epidemic.5 And most recently, the Commander-in-Chief, President
Trump, has wrought even greater damage to military justice legitimacy
through his corrosive, and unlawful, command influence. In
unprecedented fashion, President Trump exploited numerous military
justice proceedings for political gain during his reign, ranging from his
multi-year malign interference campaign in the court-martial of Sergeant
Bowe Bergdahl, to his perversion of Major Matthew Golsteyn's and
Navy Chief Eddie Gallagher's military criminal proceedings.6
Ironically, the remedial military judicial doctrine of "apparent
unlawful command influence" that Congress myopically attempted to
eliminate in NDAA 2020 is the very procedural safeguard needed to

4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. See, e.g., Ella Torres, Military Sexual Assault Victims Say the System is Broken,
ABCNEwS (Aug. 28, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/military-sexual-assault-victimssystem-broken/story?id=72499053; Steve Vladeck, It's Time to Admit that the Military
Commissions Have Failed, LAwFARE (Apr. 16, 2019, 10:40 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/itstime-admit-military-commissions-have-failed.
6. See Brief for Law Professors Joshua E. Kastenberg & Rachel E. VanLandingham as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 24, United States v. Bergdahl, No. 19-0406, 2020 WL
5167358 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/briefs/2019Term/Bergdah190
406AmicusCuriaeBrieftawProfessors.pdf (explaining how President Trump and Senator McCain
committed apparent unlawful command influence and why this due process violation demands a
powerful remedy); see also Richard A. Oppel Jr., Bowe Bergdahl Avoids Prison for Desertion;
Trump
Calls
Sentence
a
'Disgrace',
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2017),

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/us/bowe-bergdahl-sentence.html.

See generally Rachel E.

VanLandingham, Betrayer in Chief? Pardoning Troops Accused or Convicted of Murder Would

Wound
Military,
USA
TODAY
(May
23,
2019,
9:51
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/21/donald-trump-military-pardons-column/37445
61002 (warning of the negative effect of President Trump's military justice interference on military
good order and discipline); Andrew Dyer, Did Trump's Actions in Edward Gallagher'sNavy SEAL
Case Undermine Military Justice?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019, 4:22 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-26/do-trumps-interventions-undermine-militaryjustice-and-commander-authority (discussing how Trump's actions undermine the authority of
military commanders).
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counter such interference, as this Article demonstrates.' This rather
arcane judicial doctrine, one unique to the military, was fitfully
developed years ago by the top military appellate court, a body that
Congress charged decades ago with preserving the legitimacy of the
military justice system. 8 This doctrine sprung from that court's enduring
recognition that both intentional and unintentional command corruption
of courts-martial is perniciously pervasive in a justice system built upon
the ancient DNA of a draconian and arbitrary command tool-a system
in which the operating environment remains an orders-driven,
9
hierarchical, and profoundly coercive special society. Apparent
unlawful command influence doctrine was rooted, and should remain
rooted, in the understanding that if endemic command corruption is not
strongly deterred, it will ultimately be fatal to the military's fair criminal
justice system-at least one based on contemporary constitutional
values. And that is the one that the women and men in American
military uniform deserve.
This Article demonstrates that apparent unlawful command
influence doctrine, in helping ensure military justice proceedings are
both based, and perceived to be based, on independent decision-making
free from command desires, is not simply a legislative nicety that can be
eliminated with amended text. It is constitutionally required. Attempts to
eliminate it should therefore be thrown, by a courageous high military
appellate court, into the dustbin where all unconstitutional legislative
10
attempts should molder after meeting rigorous judicial analysis.
The protective doctrine of apparent unlawful command influence
continues to rest on federal statutes, specifically Article 37 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ" or the "Code"), despite its
1
More importantly, this doctrine is firmly
recent NDAA 2020 alteration."
guarantee of due process-a right
Amendment's
Fifth
the
grounded in
Congress cannot eliminate through the language of Article 37 or
elsewhere by statute.12 This same due process foundation also undergirds
the constitutionality of judicial remedy for unintentional "actual"
7. See discussion infra Part III.
8.

See infra Part II.B.

9. See generally Rachel E. VanLandingham, Military Due Process: Less Military & More
Process, 94 TUL. L. REv. 1 (2019) (laying the due process foundation for apparent unlawful
command influence doctrine while emphasizing unique operating milieu of military justice that
require such a doctrine and its remedial power).
10.

See infra Part IV.

11. UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837. The provisions of the UCMJ are codified at Chapter 47 of
the United States Code, encompassing 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946(a). In military practice, UCMJ articles
are more commonly cited than United States Code provisions, hence this Article frequently follows
suit. See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 52 n.77

(10th ed. 2018) (describing this convention).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/9
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unlawful command influence, another perversion of justice that the
NDAA 2020 shortsightedly attempts to eliminate.'
The argument set forth in this Article is simple: systemic legitimacy
of criminal justice processes and procedures is a long-recognized due
process principle. Apparent unlawful command influence is command
action that harms the legitimacy of the military justice system; it
manifests as a denial of due process to the servicemember whose
conviction occurred within such a tainted process.' 4 Given this
constitutional underpinning, Congress cannot eliminate a judicial
remedy for such a due process violation, though it sure appears to have
tried to do just that in NDAA 2020.15 Because of this doctrine's
sounding in due process, the military appellate court that sits at the apex
of the military justice system must block the damage NDAA 2020
attempts to wreak by reminding Congress, the United States military,
and the American public that the Constitution protects those who protect
our nation. This court needs to remind all involved that despite Article
37's new language: (1) apparent unlawful command influence is still
good doctrine, (2) unintentional command influence is still command
corruption, and (3) both deny servicemembers their due process right to
fair criminal proceedings untainted by command manipulation. The
presence of such types of malign influence in certain courts-martial
proceedings demands strong deterrent medicine, regardless of
congressional misunderstandings to the contrary.16
This Article outlines how the top military appellate court can so
remind Congress of the Constitution's requirements. First, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF") should clarify that apparent
unlawful command influence constitutes a due process violation that
demands redress.' 7 Due process is contextual, and in the military milieu,
the substantial rights of an accused include a right to a court-martial
proceeding, untainted both in appearance and in fact, by the perversion
of command influence.
Second, the CAAF should clarify that apparent unlawful command
influence remains squarely violative of Article 37, despite the new
verbiage added in late 2019 through NDAA 2020.18 The CAAF needs to
elucidate that apparent unlawful command influence's due process
13.

See infra Part IV.

14. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot
adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty."); see also discussion infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.

16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
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harm-specifically, a threat to the systemic legitimacy of military
justice-has always and continues to constitute legal error that
"materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused"-a
requirement which although "new" to Article 37, has long been part of
the UCMJ. 19 Third, the CAAF and the lower service appellate courtsand the military trial judiciary when facing cases with such command
corruption-should also justify finding legal error on due process
grounds when unintentional command influence taints courts-martial
proceedings, firmly sending the message to Congress that despite its
20
Fifth
legislative attempt to overrule United States v. Barry,
Amendment due process requires the same judicial remedy utilized in
that case."
Part II contextualizes the modern military justice system: since due
process requirements are situational, the military's special reality is key
to what process is due. 22 This Part further highlights that both Article 37
and its enforcer, the top military appellate court, were birthed in 1950 as
vital due process safeguards: they were necessary compromises to allow
a command-run criminal justice system, one infused with contemporary
constitutional criminal justice principles, to operate within the military's
coercive society.23 Further, in Part I, this Article notes that the other
command influence-its
fail-safe against unlawful
structural
criminalization per a specific UCMJ offense-remains just as dead
today as it was on arrival in 1951, making the apparent unlawful
4
command influence doctrine's deterrent effect even more vital.
Part III outlines Article 37's scope and summarizes its judicial
development, explaining the CAAF's separate "actual" versus
"apparent" unlawful command influence (colloquially referred to by
military courts and practitioners as "UCI") doctrines.25 Part IV analyzes
the recent NDAA 2020 attempt to eliminate the latter, as well as its
attempt to prevent unintentional actual influence from constituting legal
error. 26 Here, this Article argues that the new language merely reiterates
the longstanding threshold of harm that both actual and apparent
unlawful command influence have always cleared. The "apparent"
variety has always materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the
accused, so this new language does nothing except force the CAAF to be
19. This definition of legal error has long been found in UCMJ art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C
see discussion infra Part IV.A.
20. 78 M.J. 70 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
22. See discussion infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part I.
25. See discussion infra Part III.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/9
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clearer about its harm analysis. 27 Additionally, this Article argues that
due process trumps the NDAA 2020's attempt (no pun intended) to limit
unauthorized command influence to only intentional conduct by
textually prohibiting only "attempted" influence. 28 Indeed, the Fifth
Amendment not only authorizes the military courts to continue
identifying unintentional command influence as legal error, but it
requires that they do so.
This Article concludes with a plea for greater transparency, public
debate, and due deliberateness in congressional modification of the
military justice system in general. 29 The numerous piecemeal,
well-intentioned, but at times short-sighted, changes made to the UCMJ
over the last decade risk Frankensteining military justice into a structure
unworthy of those who sacrifice the most for our nation.
II.

CONTEXT AND NATURE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

A.

The MilitaryIs Different

The uniqueness of the military as a distinct society cannot be
overstated. Its characteristics are critical to understanding what due
process demands of its justice system, as such demands are contextual in
nature. The United States Supreme Court "has long recognized that the
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society."3 0 By "specialized," the Court is largely referring to the armed
forces' unique organizational composition. What predominantly makes
the United States military so different from the civilian world is its
coercive, orders-driven operating environment that revolves around a
framework of hierarchical command and control.31 This organizational
design grants order-giving authority to those with requisite rank and
vests specific members-those designated as "commanders"-with
enormous degrees of authority and control over assigned personnel. 32
27.
28.

See infra Part Iv.
See infra Part IV.

29. See infra Part v.
30. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("we have also recognized that the military has,
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history.").
31.

See

generally FRANCIS

FUKUYAMA

&

ABRAM

N.

SHULSKY,

THE

"VIRTUAL

CORPORATION" AND ARMY ORGANIZATION (1997) (noting instances of flat organizational structure
within predominantly hierarchical militaries); see also John F. Price, Jr., Napoleon's Shadow:
Facing OrganizationalDesign Challenges in the U.S. Military, JOINT FORCE Q., Jan. 2013, at 48,
48 (lamenting the military's outdated structure of vertical command, control, and information flow).
32. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGUL. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 1-6 (Jul. 24,
2020) (explaining the privilege, elements, and characteristics of command); U.S. DEP'T OF NAVY,
STANDARD ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS MANUAL para. 1.2.1 (Jul. 16, 2012) ("Command is
the authority which a leader lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.");
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As the Court has also noted, obedience and the means to ensure
such reflexive compliance with orders are integral to maintaining such
organizational design": "[C]enturies of experience have developed a
hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in
its application to the military establishment and wholly different from
civilian patterns."34 In other words, this command-driven organizational
structure depends on disciplinary systems, both administrative and
criminal, to sustain it, with the latter known as the military justice
system. 3s
As with all criminal justice systems, military justice is a means to
an end. Given that compliance with orders is the organizational modus
operandi of the military, the facilitation of such compliance is the end
that the military justice system serves. 36 Simply put, military justice,
albeit within a complex structure of UCMJ procedures designed in 1950
in part to protect the rights of the accused, has long been, and at heart

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 103(5) (2019) [hereinafter 2019 MCM]

(defining "commander" as "a commissioned officer in command or an officer in charge ...

unless

the context indicates otherwise"); see also THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, THE
MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 2 (Jenny A. Liabenow et al. eds., 15th ed. 2019) ("Concept

of command carries .. . [l]egal authority over people, including power to discipline."). See generally
Mie Augier et al., Advancing the Field of Organizations Through the Study of Military
Organizations, 23 INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE 1417 (2014) (analyzing the interaction between the

field of organization studies and the decision-making and behaviors in militaries).
33. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) ("The inescapable demands of military
discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate
compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or
reflection.").
34. Id. (noting also that "no military organization can function without strict discipline and
regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting"); see also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.

137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty."); In re Grimley, 137 U.S.
147, 153 (1890) ("Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to
command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier.").
35. While the military justice system can broadly be defined as including the various
branches' lesser administrative disciplinary measures, its usage in this Article denotes military
criminal law: its offenses, processes, and rules, including the unique non-judicial punishment found
in Article 15 of the UCMJ. See generally LAWRENCE J. MORRIS, MILITARY JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO
THE ISSUES 1 (2010) (the military justice system is a "system [that] governs all military personnel,
thousands of whom receive some form of discipline every year"). See also William K. Suter,
forward to EVOLVING MILITARY JUSTICE, at ix (Eugene R. Fidell & Dwight H. Sullivan eds., 2002)
(describing the military justice system as "the system of rules that governs the conduct of members

of the armed forces and the procedures by which those are enforced"); Jack L. Rives & Steven J.
Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus MilitaryJustice in the United States: A ComparativeAnalysis, 52 A.F.

L. REV. 213, 213 (2002) (referring to military criminal law processes as part of the overall military
justice system).
36. See MORRIS, supra note 35, at 3 (emphasizing that "[t]he core demand of a military
organization is obedience to lawful orders"). See generally JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY
JUSTICE 5-6 (1992) (noting different objectives between the civilian and military justice systems).
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8

VanLandingham: Ordering Injustice: Congress, Command Corruption of Courts-Martia

ORDERINGINJUSTICE

2020]

219

remains, a commander's tool to maintain discipline.3 7 Military justice is
the oil for the hierarchical cogs that make the military turn, developed to
allow commanders to send their men and women into intolerable
situations to unflinchingly engage in challenging and dangerous
conduct. 38 As the leading military law scholar of the last few decades has
noted, "The system's function and purpose have not changed since the
original Articles of War were adopted in the 1700s. It was, and remains,
a system designed to enforce discipline and good order."39
B.

SafeguardsAgainst Command Influence

While the maintenance of good order and discipline has been the
essential goal of the military justice system since the Continental
Congress adopted the British Articles of War for the Continental Army
in 1775, Congress reformed this system after World War II out of
recognition that the achievement of justice leads to good order and
discipline, and unfair and unjust treatment has the opposite effect.40 Such
reform was long overdue, given that prior to the UCMJ's overhauling
and standardizing of the Articles of War and Navy Articles,4 1
courts-martial were "simply instrumentalities of the executive power
provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-[C]hief to aid
him in properly commanding the [A]rmy and [N]avy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives."" Military criminal law and process functioned
almost exclusively as command tools: commanders regularly dictated
the guilt and punishment of the servicemembers they court-martialed,
37. See MORRIS, supra note 35, at 3 ("If there is a single reason for a code of military justice,
it is the enforcement of discipline to manage the peculiar demands of maintaining an effective
fighting force."); see also Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris Jenks, A Military Justice Solution in Search of

a Problem: A Response to Vladeck, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 34 (2015) ("The Court has long
recognized the distinct nature of tribunals established pursuant to this authority and that these

tribunals perform specialized purposes altogether different from those that animate the system of
civilian justice governed by Article II."); David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice
Conundrum: Justice or Discipline, 215 MIL. L. REV. 1, 72 (2013). See generally LURIE, supra note
36 (noting different objectives between the civilian and military justice systems).
38. See Luther C. West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1970).
39.

David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for

Reform, 73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 207 (2015); see also Jeremy S. Weber, Whatever Happened to
Military Good Order and Discipline, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123, 125 (2017).
40.

See Schlueter, supra note 37, at 72 (recounting and analyzing the numerous theories

regarding the relationship between discipline and justice).
41. See Schlueter, supra note 37, at 4 (describing the creation of the UCMJ).
42.

Establishment of Military Justice: Hearing on H.R. 23628 Before the Subcomm. of the

Comm. on Mil. Aff, 66th Cong. 1183 (1919) (statement of Enoch H. Crowder, Major General, U.S.
Army) (emphasis added); see also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d

rev. ed. 1920) (emphasizing the command nature of the system).
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ordered courts-martial to reconvene after acquittals, and retaliated
against jurors and witnesses.4 3 Military justice was, far too often,
whatever commanders wanted it to be.
The outcry of millions of Americans, exposed in both World Wars
to such command manipulation of military criminal proceedings,
prompted the creation of today's modern military justice system: the
45
1950 legislation that crafted the UCMJ. This reform represents a
reconciliation of objectives that were traditionally seen as competing:
the need for commanders' access to criminal processes to ensure good
order and discipline, on one hand, versus the need for robust procedural
safeguards to protect servicemembers' rights plus formal process for
46
producing results based on facts and law, versus command desires.
In creating the UCMJ, the biggest struggle Congress engaged in
dealt with how to best immunize the entire courts-martial process from
arbitrary command influence, yet still have the military justice system
operate as a means for commanders to ensure unit good order and
discipline. 47 The dangerous influence Congress was rightly concerned
about did not simply refer to commanders' penchant for ordering
convictions regardless of the evidence; it was obvious that practice had
to be explicitly prohibited. Congress further recognized that the immense
power of commanders-and those that wear their mantle-to sway
court-martial proceedings from start to finish worked in far more subtle
48
ways than simply through the giving of orders.
An environment that runs on inculcated obedience to command
desires, coupled with commanders' vast power to control large swaths of
servicemembers' lives, meant and still means that commanders (and
43. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Unform Code of Military Justice, 6
VAND. L. REv. 169, 170, 175-76 (1953) (detailing command practices pre-UCMJ); see also West,

supra note 38, at 44-45 ("In addition to the conclusions to be drawn from the number of extreme
sentences that were imposed during World War II, command control of the court-martial sentencing
process was raised and proved in a sufficient number of cases to indicate a serious and widespread
acceptance of this principle by military commanders.").
44. See generally West, supra note 38, at 73-79 (noting the finding of the post-WWII
congressionally

appointed

Vanderbilt

commission

"that

commanding

officers

frequently

'dominated' the independent judgment of the courts, and simply did not follow the system that was
laid down in the Manual for Courts-Martial,but adjudged it their duty to interfere with the

court-martial process for 'disciplinary purposes"').
45. See generally MORRIS, supra note 35, at 1-2 (demonstrating why Congress decided to
create the UCMJ).
46. See Schlueter, supra note 37, at 4 (stating that, in drafting the UMCJ, "Congress struggled
to balance the need for the commander to maintain discipline within the ranks against the belief that
the military justice system could be made fairer, to protect the rights of servicemembers against the
arbitrary actions of commanders").
47. See generally VanLandingham, supra note 9, at 21-35 (canvassing the history of this
problem).
48. See id. at 24-25.
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their representatives) can influence, both consciously as well as
unintentionally, subordinate decision-makers in criminal proceedings.
Commanders' words and actions can prompt said actors to reach
conclusions that may be based more on the subordinate actors' desire to
please authority, versus making decisions grounded in a good faith
understanding of facts and law.49
Indeed, simply the fact that a courtgmartial has been convened by a
commander-the same military authority who chooses the defendant,
the criminal charges, and the jury (and whose wisdom the very lives of
the actors in the proceeding may depend in future battle)-indicates to
all involved that the accused is worthy of punishment. Hence Congress,
in its mid-century reform, enacted numerous protective bulwarks against
such structural vulnerability to command perversion of a criminal justice
system, protections designed to better align courts-martial with
constitutional principles."
First, Congress created a robust military appellate court structure
with the CAAF at its apex.5' Although commanders retained almost
unfettered prosecutorial discretion in their convening authority capacity,
the 1950 UCMJ established the CAAF as a civilian-constituted appellate
court charged with guarding the military justice system from arbitrary
command manipulation; this court was "designed to ensure, at the final
stage of the process, independence from command control."" Congress
later required the services to each create a service appellate court to
serve as a bridge between the trial level and the CAAF.53

49. Indeed, Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines influence as "the power or capacity of
causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways," "the act or power of producing an effect without
apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command," and the "corrupt interference with
authority
for
personal
gain."
Influence,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
50. See vanLandingham, supra note 9, at 21-24.
51. Id. at 22. This highest military appellate court was first known as the Court of Military
Review, then the Court of Military Appeals ("CMA"), and was finally designated in 1994 as the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF"). See MORRIS, supra note 35, at 115; see also
United

States

Court

of

Appeals

for

the

Armed

Forces,

LIB.

OF

CONG.,

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/Court-of-Appeals-A.F.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2020). The
CAAF has discretionary jurisdiction over most appeals as well as non-discretionary jurisdiction
when cases are certified by the top judge advocates of each service. See UCMJ art. 67,
10 U.S.C. § 867 (UCMJ provision establishing the jurisdiction of the service appellate courts and
the CAAF). Limited appellate review by the Supreme Court is provided in UCMJ art. 867(a), 10
U.S.C. § 867(a). The military services also each have their own immediate appellate court, whose
decisions are reviewed by the CAAF. See UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (establishing said courts,
with the Marine Corps and Navy sharing one service appellate court).
52.

See MORRIS, supra note 35, at 115.

53. Id.; see also Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (directing, in
Article 66, that every Judge Advocate General establish a court of military review "for the purpose
of reviewing court-martial cases").
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Congress created other safeguards against command control of
military justice as well, such as the formation of a distinct trial judiciary
made independent from command in the same Military Justice Act of
1968 that created the service appellate courts. This change made
military lawyers "judges", and not merely "law officers" as they had
been since the 1920 Articles of War, giving them authority to control the
courtroom and finally more power than even the panel president."
Referred to by the high military appellate court as the "'last sentinel' in
the trial process to protect a court-martial from unlawful command
influence," trial judges earned their current level of independence from
command at the height of the Vietnam War, when concern over the
military's treatment of its own had once again caught the public's
attention.56
Critically, as an essential ingredient of its 1950 incorporation of
modern due process principles into the military justice system, Congress
gave the CAAF, its newly-minted military court of last resort, an explicit
charge regarding the preservation of fair and just military criminal
process (and later gave the same charge to the trial judges presiding over
courts-martial). 57 This congressional order to the CAAF was clear: that it
was the duty of the military's highest appellate court to ensure that
unlawful command influence-the pervasive command corruption of
courts-martial proceedings that precipitated the UCMJ in the first
place-was redressed and deterred. Congress made this charge in Article
37, the Code's formal prohibition of what was titled, until the NDAA
58
2020 amendment, "unlawfully influencing action of court."
While first a component of the short lived 1949 Articles of War,
what became Article 37 of the UCMJ in the 1950 legislation differed
from the complete ban on all command influence originally
recommended by the influential committee tasked by the War
59
Department to assess such influence. As modified in 1968, Article 37
read from 1968 until December 2019 as:
§ 837. Art. 37. Unlawfully influencing action of court
(a) No authority convening a general, special, or summary
court-martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure,

54.
55.
56.
at 23-24.
57.
58.
2019).
59.

Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335.
Id. at 1338; see VanLandingham, supra note 9, at 23.
United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 14 (C.A.A.F. 2006); VanLandingham, supra note 9,
See VanLandingham, supra note 9, at 24.
See 2019 MCM, supra note 32, app. 2 at A2-13-14; 10 U.S.C.

§ 837

(1964) (amended

See VanLandingham, supra note 9, at 25 (detailing this development).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss1/9

12

VanLandingham: Ordering Injustice: Congress, Command Corruption of Courts-Martia

ORDERING INJUSTICE

2020]

223

reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by
the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in
the conduct of the proceeding. No person subject to this chapter may
attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action
of a court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof,
in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any
convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his
judicial acts. The foregoing provisions of the subsection shall not apply
with respect to (1) general instructional or informational courses in
military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of
instructing members of a command in the substantive and procedural
aspects of courts-martial, or (2) to statements and instructions given in
open court by the military judge, president of a special court-martial,
or counsel.
(b) In the preparation of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report,
or any other report or document used in whole or in part for the
purpose of determining whether a member of the armed forces is
qualified to be advanced, in grade, or in determining the assignment or
transfer of a member of the armed forces or in determining whether a
member of the armed forces should be retained on active duty, no
person subject to this chapter may, in preparing any such report (1)
consider or evaluate the performance of duty of any such member as a
member of a court-martial, or (2) give a less favorable rating or
evaluation of any member of the armed forces because of the zeal with
which such member, as counsel, represented any accused before a
court-martial.60

Before highlighting the CAAF's doctrinal interpretation of this
provision, it is important to note that there are criminal teeth to Article
37, though they have never chewed anything or anyone. The UCMJ
consists of both punitive articles (a list of enumerated criminal offenses)
and procedural ones, such as Article 37. One such punitive provision
was specifically intended, as clear from the legislative history, to make
intentional unlawful command influence a crime, as well as other
procedural violations of the military justice process. 61 In fact,
mid-century advocates for reform of the UCMJ's predecessor, the
Articles of War, worried that Article 37's mere procedural prohibition
60.

See 2019 MCM, supra note 32, app. 2 at A2-13-14.

61. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE: TEXT, REFERENCES AND COMMENTARY BASED ON
THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON A UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE TO THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE 127-28 (1949) [hereinafter UCMJ COMMENTARY] ("Paragraph (2) is new, and is
intended to enforce procedural provisions of this Code, for example, Article 37 (Unlawfully
Influencing Action of Court).").
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would be inadequate in stemming the tide of command corruption of
courts-martial; they lobbied for federal indictment of commanders who
so perverted military justice. 62
Congress listened by criminalizing Article 37 violations, but kept
63
this offense in-house, nesting it in Article 98 (now Article 131f).
However, as those mid-century reformers forecasted, this offense was
dead on arrival and remains moribund. 4 It was as unrealistic then as it is
now to imagine that commanders (who remain the individuals with the
authority to prosecute all UCMJ offenses) will charge a fellow
prosecutor with manipulation of the military justice system, and the
offense's heightened mens rea means that more common unintentional
influence is not violative of this provision. This offense's desuetude
makes judicial remedies of Article 37 violations vital, given the lack of
any other effective deterrent.
III.

LEGAL FIDELITY & SYSTEMIC LEGITIMACY: THE DOCTRINE

It is clear from the rich history of Article 37 that it is meant to be a
structural as well as individual bulwark against unfair military criminal
proceedings, those tainted by conduct that makes an observer wonder
whether relevant decisions were based on facts and law versus molded
by command pressure. As the high military appellate court has
elaborated, unlawful command influence is "an improper manipulation
of the criminal justice process which negatively affects the fair handling
and/or disposition of a case."65 The goal of prohibiting such
manipulation is to ensure that only appropriate factors-as defined by
law-are considered by court-martial decision-makers at particular
stages of a criminal prosecution and trial.
Consideration of other, extralegal factors (such as knowing that
one's Commander-in-Chief has stated that he wants all sexual assault
offenders given punitive discharges), particularly those factors glistening

62. See West, supra note 38, at 79.
63. The new UCMJ crime for intentionally committing unlawful influence in violation of
Article 37 was first an amendment to Article 70 of the pre-existing Articles of War, a provision that
previously only criminalized unnecessary delays in case dispositions. See MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, art. 70 at 294 (1949). Article 70 became Article 98 in the 1968
UCMJ reform and held that any person subject to the code who "(2) knowingly and intentionally
fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this Code regulating the proceedings before, during,
or after trial of an accused; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." UCMJ COMMENTARY,
supra note 61, at 127-28; see also UCMJ art. 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898. This provision is now found in
UCMJ art. 131f, 10 U.S.C. § 931f.
64. No one has ever been prosecuted for violating this provision. See VanLandingham, supra
note 9, at 31.
65. United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 247 (C.A.A.F. 2017); see also United States v.
Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
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with the patina of military command, involves a "corruption of the
truth-seeking function of the trial process."6 6 In acknowledgment of
Article 37's historical roots, the court characterizes this manipulation as
"impermissible command control" 67 that "brings the commander into the
deliberation." 68 In one of the first unlawful command influence appellate
cases, the court emphasized that "[t]here can be no doubt that every
person tried by court-martial is entitled to have his guilt or innocence
determined by the court solely upon the evidence presented at the trial,
free from all unlawful influence exerted either by military superiors or
others." And not only the actual guilt/innocence decision: Article 37
aims to immunize all decisions in the court-martial process-from
referral (formal charging), to trial, to approval of findings and sentences,
to appellate review-from command influence. 70
A.

Unlawful CommandInfluence Doctrine: Conduct andHarm

1. Procedural Rights and Remedies
Article 37, as a procedural right, requires a remedy when it is
violated. So does the greater Fifth Amendment due process right to a fair
criminal proceeding that Article 37 operationalizes. Yet Article 37,
while clearly prohibiting the injection of command desires into military
criminal proceedings by proscribing several distinct types of conduct, up
until the recent NDAA 2020 change, did not address what constitutes
reversible (harmful) error-that which can be remedied. 71 That is, it did
not specifically address what magnitude of harm allows a court to hold a
court-martial finding or sentence incorrect because of an Article 37
violation, and thus provide the requisite remedy, such as dismissal at the
trial level or reversal or remand for new sentencing on appeal. However,
as explained in this Article, it did not need to because Article 59 of the

66. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).
67. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 247 (quoting United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 584 (N-M.C.M.R
1990)).
68. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 33 M.J. 132, 133 (C.M.A. 1991); see also United States v.
Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590, aff'd, 33 M.J. 209 (C.M.A. 1991) (citing United States v. Grady, 15 M.J.
275, 276 (C.M.A. 1983)) (describing such influence as "whether the convening authority has been
brought into the deliberation room").
69. United States v. Isbell, 3 C.M.A. 782, 786 (1954).
70. The CAAF has repeatedly applied Article 37 to the prosecutorial decision phase of
courts-martial. See, e.g., Barry, 78 M.J. at 79-80 (reversing sexual assault conviction due to
unlawful command influence in referral phase).
71. Article 37, as of December 2019, now states, in pertinent part, that: "(c) No finding or
sentence of a court-martial may be held incorrect on the ground of a violation of this section unless
the violation materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused." See UCMJ art. 37, 10
U.S.C § 837.
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UCMJ has remained unchanged since 1956 and has always provided
72
answers to this question in the unlawful command influence realm.
The question of the magnitude of harm required is not hypothetical,
given that command manipulation of courts-martial extends beyond
impacting the important rights of a particular accused, to negatively
impacting the legitimacy of the military justice system as a whole. Given
Article 37's identity as a key compromise for the commander-owned
military justice system to continue operating under such command
control, and the fact that there is no other practical deterrent to
pernicious command influence, the degree of harm required before
judicial remedial action should be taken in instances of command
influence is a vitally important one.
With this in mind, Article 37 should be analyzed in two steps: What
conduct is prohibited by this provision, and what is the ramification for a
particular case that involves such prohibited conduct? As discussed
above, the consequence of an Article 37 violation certainly has never
been military prosecution, or any type of disciplinary action for the
commander or their representative who engaged in said misconduct,
73
despite the original UCMJ drafters' intent.
Instead, the only consequencesfor violatingArticle 37 to date have
been remedial actions taken by military trial judges and appellate courts.
And the only way military trial judges and appellate courts can take
remedial action is if they first find legal error in the case before themlegal error being a violation of one of Article 37's various prohibitions.
And not just any legal error-legal error that causes sufficient harm
warranting a judicially-mandated remedy, with some harm being that the
74
actual proceedings have been tainted by that legal error.
2. Article 37's Prohibited Conduct
Before this Article further explores the magnitude of harm
necessary to warrant remedial action in an unlawful command influence
case, it is important to note what conduct Article 37 specifically
prohibits. This provision prohibits injecting command desires into
military criminal proceedings in three distinct ways. First, the Article's
express proscription against reprimand and censure of court-martial
personnel is a reaction to the historic practice of convening authorities
72. See infra Part IV.B.
73. See supra Part IIB. Perhaps a servicemember could have their efficiency report
(performance evaluation) corrected by the requisite correcting body based on Article 37's
prohibition of mention of court-martial duty in said report, but such consequence is limited to this
blatant type of Article 37 transgression.
74.

See generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When

Should Legal ErrorBe Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995) (discussing the harm threshold
for legal error).
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chastising court-martial participants for failing to convict or render a
sufficiently severe sentence, conduct sure to chill the future performance
of courts-martial.75 Article 37's second prohibition-barring a
servicemember's participation in a court-martial from reflection in
performance reports and consideration in future assignments-added in
1968, is also a straightforward legislative addition to end corrosive
practices. 76
However, Article 37's original textual prohibition of both coercion
and "unauthorized" influence, text which remained unchanged until
NDAA 2020's alteration, is less straightforward and has resulted in
judicial development of a multifactor analytical approach. 77 Between
1950 and December 2019, Article 37 read in relevant part:
No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any
other military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings
or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or
reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts. 78

Whereas coercion is relatively easy to identify given the military's
orders-based organization, the military court has wrestled with the
contours of the statute's other category: influence by any unauthorized
means. 79 In determining whether certain conduct constitutes such
prohibited influence, the court, through its opinions, has created a long
list of behaviors that judge advocates warn their commanders and
command representatives not to engage in.80 These run the gamut from
pre-trial command lectures to courts-martial participants,81 to
75. See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 11, at § 6-6(C) (noting the "chilling effect" of
commanders' critical post-trial comments).
76. UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (amended to include subsection (b) by the Military
Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, 1338).
77. See United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
78. UCMJ art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (1950) (amended 2019).
79. Instead of simply prohibiting influence, unmodified by the statute's "unauthorized"
caveat, as the post-WWII war Department committee established to study this issue strongly

recommended-and as the federal obstruction of justice criminal statute does-the Army claimed
such limiting language was needed to ensure counsel could make appropriate arguments during
court. See vanLandingham, supra note 9, at 26 (recounting this history).
80.

For an extensive treatment that includes numerous probative examples of unlawful

command influence cases, see SCHLUETER, supra note 11, at

§§

6-3-6-9. See generally James F.

Garrett et al., Lawful Command Emphasis: Talk Offense, Not Offender; Talk Process, Not Results,

ARMY LAW., Aug. 2014, at 4 (reviewing this catalog).
81. United States v. Navarre, 5 C.M.A. 32, 37 (1954) (discussing the propriety of
commanders' pre-trial instructions to court-martial members). Pre-trial unlawful influence can also

occur in panel member selection by convening authorities. See, e.g., United States v. Riesbeck, 77
M.J. 154, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (panel selection by convening authority constituted unlawful
command influence because members were chosen due to belief that they would be more inclined to
convict).
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commanders or their staff pressuring subordinate convening authorities
82
regarding the subordinate's discretionary decision to prosecute, to
83
improper reference to command policy in counsel's argument, to
presence of commanders in the courtroom during courts-martial
proceedings, 84 to post-trial processing pressures 85 and post-trial conduct
that can affect future courts-martial. 86
B.

Two Different Harms Mean Two Types ofMalign Influence

1. Actual and Apparent Unlawful Command Influence
This Article's primary concern deals with how the court (meaning
the CAAF) determines whether or not impermissible command
manipulation of the court-martial process, once identified, constitutes
harmful legal error. That is, error that is subject to remedial action by
either the trial judge or the appellate court seized of the issue. This
Article is concerned with this harm because of NDAA 2020's textual
alterations to Article 37-and whether they changed or should change
the court's analysis regarding harm in any way.
The issue of harm, and the unique beast that is unlawful command
influence, has caused the CAAF's doctrine to delineate two different
categories of unlawful command influence: one of which the court has
labeled "actual" and the other "apparent" (or "the appearance of")
unlawful command influence. 87 The difference between these two
categories of prohibited influence is the type of harm caused. Actual
unlawful command influence is defined by the CAAF as "improper
manipulation of the criminal justice process which negatively affects the
fair handling and/or disposition of a case," meaning it affects the
outcome of the court-martial process. 88 While such outcomes include, of
course, fmdings and sentences, they also include whether or not the
particular charges would have been referred to a court-martial but for the
82. See generally United States v. Rivera, 12 C.M.A. 507 (1961); United States v. Allen, 31
M.J. 572, 591 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990), affd, 33 M.J. 209 (C.M.A. 1991).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Grady, 15 MJ. 275, 276 (C.M.A. 1983) (considering as
unlawful command influence the defense counsel's reference to command policy); see also United
States v. Estrada, 7 C.M.A. 635, 639 (1957) (considering as unlawful command influence the
reading of a command policy by trial counsel to panel prior to sentencing).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 20-21 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (finding that the
convening authority constituted some burden-shifting threshold of some evidence of unlawful
command influence).
85. United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 252-53 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
86. United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646, 651-52 (A.C.M.R. 1984), aff'd 23 M.J. 151
(C.M.A. 1986).
87. United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 84 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
88. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 247-49.
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unlawful command influence, whether a material witness would have
testified that did not, etc. 89 This is an effects-based approach that centers
on tangible consequences of unlawful influence.
The other category of unlawful command influence, apparent
influence, similarly involves prohibited Article 37 misconduct, but that
which causes a different type of prejudice. 90 In apparent unlawful
command influence cases, the court-martial outcome would have been
the same whether or not such prohibited conduct had occurred (the same
applies in cases that were likely affected by unlawful command
influence, but the actual effects of said pernicious influence cannot be
ascertained, hence leaving the court to conclude that the results would
have been the same even without the illegality). 91 Despite such lack of
tangible impact on the accused's particular court-martial results,
apparent unlawful command influence taints the accused's proceedings
by delegitimizing the entire military justice system, including the instant
proceeding; such delegitimization requires remedial action (with
prospective deterrent effect).
The CAAF specifically defines apparent unlawful command
influence-proven violations of Article 37 that cannot be shown as
impacting specific court-martial outcomes yet are systemically
dangerous enough to warrant strong medicine-as the following: when
"an objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and
circumstances, would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of the
proceeding." 92 The harm caused by apparent unlawful command
influence, instead of the danger that the accused's findings or sentences
may have been or are likely to be different, is "damage to the public's
perception of the fairness of the military justice system as a whole."9 3
That is, "[e]ven if there was no actual unlawful command influence,
there may be a question whether the influence of command placed an
'intolerable strain on public perception of the military justice system."' 94
If such a strain exists, it deprives the accused of their due process right
to a structurally-untainted system (in other words, it materially

89. See United States v. Johnston, 39 M.J. 242, 243-45 (C.M.A. 1994); Treakle, 18 M.J. 646
at 656-57.
90. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 248-49.
91. Id. at 248-49.
92. Id.
93. Id. (noting that the lack of prejudice to the accused is a factor to consider when deciding
whether the public would doubt the fairness of the proceeding and hence helps determine whether
apparent influence exists, but such prejudice is not a required factor). The author argues that the
accused also is prejudiced in the sense that she is a member of the public and is due a court-martial
untainted by gross manipulation.
94. United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 42-43 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).
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prejudices the accused's substantial rights, at least in the more precise
articulation the CAAF needs to make regarding such rights).

2. Methodology
The court's approaches for finding actual and apparent unlawful
command influence are similar, with the analysis differing slightly
depending on whether such influence is being raised at the trial versus
the appellate stage. 95 These approaches highlight the difference in the
types of harm the CAAF is aiming to mitigate in its unlawful command
influence doctrine, hence warranting a brief description.
At trial, the burden rests on the accused to raise an actual unlawful
command influence issue by showing "facts which, if true, constitute
unlawful command influence, and that the alleged unlawful command
influence has a logical connection to the court-martial, in terms of its
96
potential to cause unfairness in the proceedings." Once the defense
carries this burden, for actual unlawful command influence, the
government can successfully counter by establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the facts claimed by the accused do not exist; or
that if they do, they do not constitute unlawful command influence; or
"that the proceedings were untainted" by the demonstrated unlawful
command influence; 97 or that "the unlawful command influence will not
98
prejudice the proceedings or did not affect the findings and sentence."
99
If the government fails to carry this heavy burden, it is up to the
military judge to either prevent the unlawful command influence from
tainting the proceedings by issuing curative instructions or, if that taint
has already occurred, by fashioning measures to remedy the unlawful
influence.100

95. See United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 148-50 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (establishing the
court's modern burden-shifting template for unlawful command influence claims); see also United
States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 412-13 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (noting the distinction between unlawful
command influence analytical steps at the trial level versus those at the appellate level).
96. Lewis, 63 M.J. at 413 (citing Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150); see also United States v. Johnston,
39 M.J. 242, 244 (C.M.A 1994). This initial showing "must be more than mere 'command influence
in the air' or speculation." United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 54 M.J. 32, 34 (C.A.A.F. 2000)) (noting that this burden is low "because of the
congressional prohibition against unlawful command influence and its invidious impact on the
public perception of a fair trial"); see also Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41 ("If the defense shows such facts

by 'some evidence,' the issue is raised." (quoting Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150)).
97. Lewis, 63 M.J. at 413; see also Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41.
98. Biagase, 50 M.J. at 151; see also Harvey, 64 M.J. at 18; Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41.
99. The Government's "burden is high because 'command influence tends to deprive
service-members of their constitutional rights."' Lewis, 63 M.J. at 413 (quoting United States v.
Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).
100. Gore, 60 M.J. at 186 (noting that a trial judge's remedies for unlawful command influence
are reviewed per an abuse of discretion standard).
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At the appellate level, a de novo standard of review is used to
review unlawful command influence claims. 101 For actual such
influence, instead of showing that the alleged misconduct has the
potential to cause unfairness in the proceeding, the appellant must show
"unfairness in the court-martial proceedings (i.e., prejudice to the
accused)," and "that the unlawful influence caused that unfairness." 10 2
The Government must then "rebut the allegation by persuading the Court
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the predicate facts do not exist; (2)
the facts do not constitute unlawful influence; or (3) the unlawful
influence did not affect the findings or sentence." 103 Furthermore, if
"unlawful command influence is established at the trial level, a
presumption of prejudice is created."1 04 To affirm an appellant's
conviction, the court "must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the unlawful command influence had no prejudicial impact on the

court-martial."' 0 5
The CAAF has traced a similar analytical path for raising and
resolving apparent unlawful command influence claims, both at the trial
and appellate levels, with a key difference being the anticipated
prejudice.1'06 The accused or appellant must introduce "some

evidence"' 07 of:
(a) facts, which if true, constitute unlawful command influence; and
(b) this unlawful command influence placed an "intolerable strain" on
the public's perception of the military justice system because "an
objective, disinterested observer, fully informed of all the facts and

101. See United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 423 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (finding apparent unlawful
command influence where the Government searched military judge's official personnel file looking
for personal information to challenge the judge for bias, plus spoke ex parte with the judge's
supervisor during pendency of court-martial). The court assesses findings of fact regarding unlawful

command influence under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. villareal, 52 M.J. 27,
30 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
102. United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citing United States v. Boyce, 76
M.J. 242, 248 (C.A.A.F. 2017)); see also Lewis, 63 M.J. at 413; Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423. Appellant's
initial burden is low, like at the trial level, but more than conjecture. United States v. Ashby, 68 M.J.
108, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2009) ("Mere speculation that unlawful command influence occurred because of
a specific set of circumstances is not sufficient.").

103. Barry, 78 M.J. at 77 (citing Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423 (internal footnote omitted)); see also
United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 151 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
104. Salyer, 72 M.J. at 434 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (citing Biagase, 50 M.J. at 151).
106. See Biagase, 50 M.J. at 151.
107. United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (explaining that this is the
same quantum of evidence as that for factual issues put before the trier of fact); see also Salyer, 72
M.J. at 423 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (noting that the "quantum of evidence required to raise unlawful
command influence is 'some evidence"' (quoting Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41)); United States v.

Dugan, 58 M.J. 253, 258 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (noting that the evidence required must be "more than
mere allegation or speculation" (quoting Stoneman, 57 M.J. at 41)).
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circumstances, would harbor a significant doubt about the fairness of
108
the proceeding.

The same burden shifting that occurs in the resolution of an actual
unlawful command influence claim then kicks in: the government must
convince the court, by a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, that "the
predicate facts proffered . .. do not exist, or the facts as presented do not
10 9
The court must be
constitute unlawful command influence."
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the case "proceeded free from
0
the appearance of unlawful influence."" Whether the lower court
proceedings were free from the appearance of such influence largely
1
turns on the remedial measures, if any, taken in the prior proceedings. "'

IV.

HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW
A.

Barry and NDAA 2020

The CAAF, in its 2018 United States v. Barry opinion, found actual
unlawful command influence that it concluded was unintentionally
2
Because of
caused by the Navy's Deputy Judge Advocate General.'
this actual unlawful command influence, it reversed the conviction of the
appellant, a Navy SEAL who had been convicted of brutal anal sexual
assault. 1 3 The appellant had argued, inter alia, that since Article 37's
language prohibited "attempted" influence, and attempt crimes (despite
Article 37 being a procedural, not a criminal provision) require specific
intent, the unintentional influence by the senior Navy lawyer could not
constitute unlawful command influence in violation of Article 37.114 The
Barry majority disagreed, noting that the text at issue, Article 37's
language that had been unchanged since 1968 ("[n]o person subject to
this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means,

108. United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
109. Id. (citing Salyer, 72 M.J. at 423).
110. Salyer, 72 M.J. at 427-28 (finding that "an objective member of the public would be left
with the appearance and the impression that the Government obtained advantage from its actions"

of accessing a military judge's personal file and communicating ex parte with that judge's
supervisor during pendency of court-martial).
111. See id.
112. 78 M.J. 70, 72-79 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (finding actual unlawful command influence
unintentionally due to senior military lawyer's political pressure).
113. See id. at 77-80; see also United States v. Barry, No. 201500064, 2016 WL 6426695 at *1
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2016) (concluding that the highly-decorated Navy Chief brutally
penetrated his lover's anus with his penis after she begged him not to).
114. Barry, 78 M.J. at 78-79.
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influence the action" of a court-martial) limited the preface "attempt" to
coercion only." 5
The result of this particular appellate case was especially hard to
fathom by many, given that the CAAF's ruling overturned a hard-fought
sexual assault conviction (of a Navy SEAL, to boot, given that the SEAL
community has earned a reputation for impunity for their criminal
conduct)-a conviction achieved in a climate in which the military was
trying hard to reverse decades of disastrous handling of such crimes. I
frankly wish that the court had reached a different result by finding that
the Navy lawyer's comments, though improper, were not the cause of
the commander's disposition decision, regardless of the convening
authority's cowardly and incredulous attempts to blame his lawyer.
Regardless, difficult cases such as this one make bad law, and Congress
took the bait." 6
The NDAA 2020 alteration to Article 37 was originally sponsored
by Congresswoman Jackie Speier in response to both this and the
CAAF's subsequent unlawful command influence decision in United
States v. Boyce." 7 In this set of reforms, Article 37 was changed to
legislatively overrule the Barry court's fmrding that attempt only
modified Article 37's term of coercion and not influence." 8 The change
makes only attempted influence, not the unintentional variety as found in
Barry, prohibited. Article 37, as of December 2019's enacting of NDAA
2020, now states in pertinent part:
No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any
unauthorized means, attempt to influence the action of a court-martial
or any other military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the
findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening,
approving, or reviewing authority or preliminary hearing officer with
respect to such acts taken pursuant to this chapter as prescribed by the

President.' 19
The new NDAA 2020 Article 37 language, also in direct response
to the CAAF's Barry decision, for the first time expressly exempts
conversations between a superior convening authority or officer and a
115.

See id. at 78 (noting that an "'impropermanipulation of the criminal justice process' even

if effectuated unintentionally, will not be countenanced by this Court" (internal citation omitted)).

116. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 883
(2006) (discussing this adage).
117. 76 M.J. 242, 252-53 (C.A.A.F. 2017); see also Military Sexual Violence, supra note 3
(claiming well-deserved credit for her amazing work to reduce military sexual assault and noting
responsibility for her introduction of the NDAA 2020 "provision that would redefine unlawful

command influence in order to prevent appeals courts from needlessly overturning sexual assault
convictions").

118. See H.R. REP. No. 116-333, at 164-65 (2019) (Conf. Rep.).
119. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
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subordinate (such as the Barry scenario) regarding disposition of
criminal offenses, as long as such conversations do not include said
120
Specifically, it now
superior directing a particular disposition.
provides, in relevant part, that:
(5) (A) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) through (3), but subject to

subparagraph (B)(i) a superior convening authority or officer may generally
discuss matters to consider regarding the disposition of
alleged violations of this chapter with a subordinate
convening authority or officer; and
(ii) a subordinate convening authority or officer may seek
advice from a superior convening authority or officer
regarding the disposition of an alleged offense under this
chapter.
(B) No superior convening authority or officer may direct a
subordinate convening authority or officer to make a particular
disposition in a specific case or otherwise substitute the discretion
of such authority or such officer for that of the subordinate
12
convening authority or officer."

Article 37's new "attempt to influence" language would appear to
mean that the military courts can no longer find actual or apparent
unlawful command influence based on command corruption that is
unintentional, such as that found in the precipitating Barry fact
pattern.1 12 However, the fact that, at least by the CAAF's formulation,
actual unlawful influence requires a fmding by the court that there is
either potential for prejudice to the ongoing proceedings (at the trial
level) or that the court is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
the unlawful command influence had no prejudicial impact on the
court-martial (at the appellate level), it seems that fundamental due
process concerns demand that such unintentional unlawful command
influence still be found as legal error on constitutional grounds,
12 3
regardless of Article 37's new verbiage.
The reasoning behind this conclusion is simple. The CAAF has
already recognized that unlawful command influence rests on
constitutional due process grounds.12 4 And the United States Supreme
Court has outlined that errors of a constitutional dimension require that
120. See id.
121. United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 72-79 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
122. H.R. REP. No. 116-333 at 165 (internal quotations omitted).
123. United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150-51 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
124. United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 249 n.8 (C.A.A.F. 2017); see also vanLandingham,
supra note 9, at 62-64 (analyzing due process underpinnings of apparent unlawful command
influence).
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the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they did not affect
trial outcome.12 ' Hence it would seem that, regardless of whether
command influence is intentional or not, if an unintentional command
action raises reasonable d.oubt about the court-martial outcome (broadly
defined), it must be remedied on due process grounds, Article 37 be
damned. As for apparent unlawful command corruption that is
unintentional, that, too, will require remedial action, also based on its
firm due process moorings, as further explained below. 126
B.

Boyce and NDAA 2020: Due Process Overrules Congress

Judge Meg Ryan's dissent in the CAAF's 2017 opinion in United
States v. Boyce forecasted the knee-jerk reaction Congress had to the
case and its resultant NDAA 2020 addition of a prejudice requirement to
Article 37-with open admission that the goal of recommending such
was to eliminate the military courts' ability to find apparent unlawful
command influence.1 2 7 The pertinent change to Article 37 adds a
prejudice element that previously was not found in this Article; Article
37(c) now requires what Article 59 of the UCMJ has always required,
that: "(c) No finding or sentence of a court-martial may be held incorrect
on the ground of a violation of this section unless the violation
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused."1 28
In Boyce, the CAAF found that the Secretary of the Air Force's
meddling had created the appearance of unlawful command influence
(apparent unlawful command influence) and reversed without
prejudice. 129 In so holding, the CAAF also, consistent with its
application of its apparent unlawful command influence doctrine since at
least 2002,130 first held that there was no actual unlawful command
influence in the case because "there is no reasonable likelihood that a
different convening authority standing in the shoes of Lieutenant
General Franklin would have made a different referral decision."" The
majority then found that despite no such "actual prejudice" to the
appellant, since the conduct at issue placed an "intolerable strain on
public perception of the military justice system," apparent unlawful
command influence, hence reversible legal error, had occurred.1 12

125.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 49-50 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

126.
127.

See infra Part IV.B.
Boyce, 76 M.J. at 255 (Ryan, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 117.

128. H.R. REP. No. 116-333 at 164-65; see also 10 U.S.C.A. § 837(c) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 116-158).
129. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 252-53.
130. United States v. Stoneman, 57 M.J. 35, 40-43 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
131. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 250.
132. Id. at 252-53.
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This finding-of no reasonable likelihood that the court-martial
outcome would have been different absent the misconduct-stands, as
Judge Ryan noted in her astute dissent, seemingly in tension with Article
59 of the UCMJ, which has always required that "[a] finding or sentence
of a court-martial may not be held incorrect on the ground of an error of
law unless the error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the
accused." 133 And the CAAF has concluded, at least in non-unlawful
command influence cases, that to so prejudice the accused's substantial
rights, there must be "a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the
134
outcome of the proceeding would have been different."
As the CAAF itself stated in Boyce,
[U]nlike actual unlawful command influence where prejudice to the
accused is required, no such showing is required for a meritorious
claim of an appearance of unlawful command influence. Rather, the
prejudice involved in the latter instance is the damage to the public's
perception of the fairness of the military justice system as a whole and
13 5
not the prejudice to the individual accused.

Hence the CAAF, neither in Boyce nor anywhere else, has directly
addressed Judge Ryan's now congressionally-valid concern that
apparent unlawful command influence does not appear (pun intended) to
meet Article 59's (and now Article 37's) standard for reversible error. It
fails to meet this standard because of the CAAF's repeated, and flawed,
36
admission, such as in the above quote,1 that no prejudice to the accused
is necessary for meritorious apparent unlawful command influence
claims because it is a different prejudice at issue in such cases that
warrants remedying. The CAAF was well-intentioned but myopic when
it first said this, and still is, given the inappropriate cramping of the
13 7
Of course, the
individual harm at stake repeated in the Boyce quote.
individual whose court-martial damages the legitimacy of the entire
military justice system is also prejudiced, just not always in the sense of
a particular court-martial outcome. Their right to a substantially fair
process, regardless of outcome, falls within basic Fifth Amendment

protection.131

133. Id. at 254 (Ryan, J., dissenting); UCMJ art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C. § 859(a); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(b) ("A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was
not brought to the court's attention.").
134. United States v. Lopez, 76 M.J. 151, 154 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (quoting Molina-Martinez v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)); see also Boyce, 76 M.J at 254 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
135. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 248-49 (internal footnote omitted).
136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
138. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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The time is ripe to clarify the CAAF's earlier opinions on apparent
unlawful command influence and thread the needle by plainly stating
that yes, prejudice to the accused that is required, and has always been
required, is met by apparent unlawful command influence. The damage
done to the legitimacy of the military justice system by apparent
unlawful command influence cases has always been one that prejudices
the accused, as well, not by raising doubt in the accused's particular
outcome, but by raising doubt in the system's overall ability to deliver
fair justice.
In other words, the loss of public (the public including the military
community) confidence in the military justice system caused by
command corruption, even that corruption which does not raise a
reasonable 'doubt about the outcome of the case, constitutes error that, in
Article 59 and now Article 37's express terms, does materially prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused. 139 It admittedly does so in a manner
outside of the Lopez test with its Chapman gloss for errors of
constitutional dimension (unlawful command influence, of course, being
of such character).
The CAAF should borrow from the United States Supreme Court's
clarification in United States v. Olano,140 where the Court, in discussing
harmless error, stated that "[w]e need not decide whether the phrase
'affecting
substantial
rights'
is
always
synonymous
with
'prejudicial' . . . [t]here may be a special category of forfeited errors that
can be corrected regardless of their effect on the outcome." 14' Apparent
unlawful command influence falls into exactly such a special category,
allowing the CAAF to redefine "materially prejudices the substantial
rights of the accused"1 42 as "a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different," 4 3 or a
reasonableprobability that the legal error has placed an "intolerable
strain on public perception of the military justice system" by
underminingthe perception offairproceedings."
This reconceptualization of material prejudice to the accused's
substantial rights is necessitated by the principle of procedural due
139. See Boyce, 76 M.J. at 248-49 (internal footnote omitted).
140. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
141. Id. at 734-35 ("The third and final limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b) is
that the plain error 'affec[t] substantial rights.' This is the same language employed in Rule 52(a),
and in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings.").
142. See Boyce, 76 M.J. at 254 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting UCMJ art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C.
§ 859(a)).
143. United States v. Lopez, 76 M.J. 151, 154 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (quoting Molina-Martinez v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)).
144. Boyce, 76 M.J. at 249 (citing United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 415 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
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process, given that "we must be concerned not only with the factual
accuracy of a trial result but also with the procedures employed in
obtaining it.,"145 Procedural due process demands fairness in the
procedures the government employs to deprive someone of their life,
liberty, and property. 146 Procedural due process includes the need for
systemic legitimacy; such legitimacy depends on perceptions that the
military justice system's decision-making process is worthy of trust
because it is free from bias. 14
Maintaining public confidence in American criminal justice
systems has long been recognized as vital. Per Justice Frankfurter,
"Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice,
upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value
at stake ."1 4 8 The United States Supreme Court has further noted that
"courts have an independent interest in ensuring that .. . legal
149
This interest is even
proceedings appear fair to all who observe them."
military justice
the
that
given
forces,
weightier within the armed
this nexus is
While
security.
system's legitimacy affects national
indirect, it is real.
Servicemembers, who are part of the public that the military justice
system needs to satisfy, need to have trust that the organization-one
they have entrusted their lives to-is truly dedicated to principles of fair
criminal process. Nothing could be more damaging to good order and
discipline-dynamics essential to unit and mission effectiveness-than
lack of trust in the system that can deprive military members of their life,
liberty, and property.150 Hence, apparent unlawful command influence

145. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 395 (C.M.A. 1986) (citing Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 543-48 (1961)).
146. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 888-89
(2000).
147. See VanLandingham, supra note 9, at 68. See generally Tracey L. Meares & Tom R.
Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudenceof ProceduralJustice, 123 YALE L.J.F. 525 (2014)
(utilizing social science research to support the contention that procedural justice encourages public
perceptions of a legitimate legal system).
148. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct itself is whether the police

conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond,
for the proper use of governmental power.").

149. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988).
150. See Meares & Tyler, supra note 147, at 538 (demonstrating that social science research
shows that fair procedures are necessary for group cohesiveness; when people in a group see
"evidence that fair procedures are shaping decisions, rules, and policies, then they merge their sense

of self with the group, intertwining their identities with group values. As people identify more
closely with others and the institutions and authorities that unite them, they engage in a variety of
group supporting behaviors, including following rules, accepting decisions, cooperating with
authorities, and generally taking actions that people perceive will help their group."). This dynamic
is vitally important in the United States military.
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doctrine needs to be carefully reconciled with the NDAA 2020 statutory
changes to the Code, allowing it to continue serving the due process
needs of United States servicemembers.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the American criminal justice arena, the violation of
constitutional criminal procedure safeguards occasionally results in
guilty criminals walking free because "the constable blundered." 5 That
is the price of preserving fundamental principles, such as due process, in
systems operated by fallible human beings. The military justice system,
exquisitely vulnerable to command manipulation and influence, requires
strong deterrent medicine to ensure its constables-military
commanders-do not either intentionally or accidentally blunder and
thereby infect court-martial proceedings with improper command
desires.
This vulnerability is particularly acute because prosecutorial
discretion remains exclusively vested in non-lawyer convening
authorities-the same commanders who exercise vast amounts of control
over their subordinates' lives in an environment that inculcates
servicemembers to reflexively obey these same commanders. Over two
hundred years after the United States military allowed its non-lawyer
commanders to practice criminal law and operate the military justice
system as their often draconian and arbitrary command tool,
commanders and their representatives continue to demonstrate why such
a command-and-control arrangement has such pernicious effects on
military justice systemic legitimacy and servicemembers' rights to fair
criminal proceedings.
Until commanders no longer wield such expansive control over the
military justice system, due process will continue to require redress of
their improper influence. Even after commanders are one day taken out
of the prosecutorial loop, a change I believe will eventually come, for as
long as obedience to orders is the military's modus operandi,
commanders can and will adversely affect military criminal proceedings.
Hence, both actual and apparent unlawful command influence
prohibitions and remedies will long be needed to safeguard due process
in the military justice system.
NDAA 2020's well-intentioned but shortsighted modifications to
the most vital procedural safeguard against such command corruption of
the military justice system risk further delegitimization of that system,
and the erosion of fair court-martial proceedings for our women and men
151. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). This phrase was later
repeated by Chief Justice John Roberts in Herring v. United States. 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009).
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in uniform. Hopefully, the military appellate courts and trial judiciary
will look to due process, as recommended herein, to provide the same
protections that those who modified Article 37 tried to remove. The Fifth
Amendment shields our servicemembers from fundamental unfairness,
even when Congress fails to do the same.
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